When Saad Hariri Leads His Failing Battles All Together
By Nabeel Haitham, 04-08-2011
Every now and then, Saad Hariri tries to set what seems like a reminding stance that he is fighting at three frontlines at a time, but he provides no parallel evidence that proves his possession of the ability to resolve the battle for his own sake; neither does he provide less evidence of his ability to hold on in the battle field itself and remain steadfast against strong rivals.
It is not secret that achieving successes in battles requires objective and personal circumstances, abilities, and capacities, which are elements that do not seem to be present in the battles begun by "the chief of the majority" ever since he was forced out of the power bliss. He began his first battle against Hizbullah's arms although he had previously realized that he wouldn't gain this battle and benefit from the outcome.
Besides, these elements do not seem available in what his team likes to call "the grand battle", which is continuous against Najib Mikati's government, and which was begun by Hariri so as to execute what he had earlier told in person to the Premier while they were on a car, leaving the meeting of "Dar El-Fatwa" to Hariri's home in Wadi Abu Jamil. Then Hariri told Mikati these words exactly: "I won't leave you in peace, and do not expect that I leave you in peace. I'm even going to do everything I can to fail your government." Nevertheless, these words, in addition to the provocation and inconvenient talk haven't seemed to be affective, for Najib Mikati's government has acquired immunity on the local and foreign levels.
It is clear that Hariri has messed up in both battles; well, at least so far. Still, what seems conspicuous for observers is that the double failure hasn't created a motive for Hariri to reconsider his calculations and read facts as they are; instead; he has directly begun a third battle; this time it's against the Syrian regime, whereby the written statement Hariri issued a few days ago from his latest residence in Jeddah seems very similar to "the first statement": Hariri declares he has joined the anti-Syrian regime frontline since "it is no longer possible to tolerate what is going on in Syria", as Hariri puts it.
This, in fact, deserves objection; shouldn't Saad Hariri have considered the possibility of the decision of "Hizbullah", "Hizbullah Secretary General", or any Lebanese official to reply merely through comparing Saad Hariri's sudden "care" for the Syrian people today with his outrage when Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah talked about the Bahraini regime's crime against the Bahraini people? Why hasn't he kept in mind that one day he might have to borrow the "Sayyed's" expressions in a different context?
Hereupon, the question posed is: As long as Hariri hasn't reached an outcome in his battle against "Hizbullah" and its resistant arms, in addition to Najib Mikati and his government, why has he decided to begin the third battle against the Syrian regime? Is it his personal decision, or has this been in coordination with the Saudi Arabian command? And where does he want to get by leading this battle? Is there any choice that he can win the battle? What about the choice of losing it? Can he tell the Lebanese people that he would have acted the same way had he still been on top of the political power or had the Syrian-Saudi Initiative still been safe and conducted?
It is clear that Hariri's statement expresses his real emotions, at least ever since he was overthrown from the premier post. It is clear, too, that his statement is based on an obvious context of revenge from the second partner in his overthrowing - President Bashar Al-Assad, in addition to the first partner Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, as Hariri himself declared on "MTV Channel" (a Lebanese broadcasting company). As for announcing this revengeful context currently, it seems Hariri wants to impose it on a Syrian occasion; thus, he chose Hamah's (recent) incidents to point weapons at Al-Assad's regime.
While Hariri's fans consider his statement as a normal and an inevitable "stance of consolidation" with the Syrian people upon what it is suffering, some observers see that his statement expresses a revengeful logic, especially when the Syrian people, that suddenly Hariri has decided to consolidate with, was once chased before being the people they're (Hariri and his fans) crying for today. For instance, the Lebanese reminiscence has been full of a lot of chases and racial hunts for the Syrian workers in Lebanon since February 14th in 2005 until a very recent time. Still, what is more dangerous than this is the bias created by Hariri's speech and "the Cedars Revolution" against Syria and the Syrian people all through the past years.
What seems to have been the central reflection of Hariri and a weighty team of "the Future Party" and "the March-14 Alliance" hasn't been said by Hariri in his statement; yet, there exists a Euro-American secret word that has led him to bet on "the Syrian Month of Ramadan" and made him believe that the moment of revenging from Bashar Al-Assad has come closer. Also, it seems he has really wished he could be back to Beirut on Damascus International Airport Route this time.
Speaking about a Euro-American secret word does not exclude the fact that Hariri is unable to overcome the Saudi Arabian considerations. Hereupon, this question can be posed: Does Hariri's statement express a new Saudi Arabian stance, the second chapter of which might be the declaration of a direct stance of the Saudi Arabian command?
Still, the fear some are showing is not upon the revengeful dimension of Hariri's statement; instead, it's upon the possibility that the purpose beyond his statement is to arouse a political quarrel that increases gradually to become a political escalation first and a political clash afterwards, providing the atmosphere and environment for previously made agendas, on top of which is the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the indictments. Probably the point of the primary test is determined to be on the 11th of the current month, as the context of the indictment against the four "Hizbullah" cadres is to be exposed.
In fact, Saad Hariri's supporters have started to propagate that the indictment "includes dangerous facts that will rock Lebanon." Besides, the next testing point is to follow through the stages that are yet to come, particularly through the coming indictments, which are to include, within the accused parties, Syrian characters close to the Syrian president, the fans of Hariri are propagating.
Every now and then, Saad Hariri tries to set what seems like a reminding stance that he is fighting at three frontlines at a time, but he provides no parallel evidence that proves his possession of the ability to resolve the battle for his own sake; neither does he provide less evidence of his ability to hold on in the battle field itself and remain steadfast against strong rivals.
It is not secret that achieving successes in battles requires objective and personal circumstances, abilities, and capacities, which are elements that do not seem to be present in the battles begun by "the chief of the majority" ever since he was forced out of the power bliss. He began his first battle against Hizbullah's arms although he had previously realized that he wouldn't gain this battle and benefit from the outcome.
Besides, these elements do not seem available in what his team likes to call "the grand battle", which is continuous against Najib Mikati's government, and which was begun by Hariri so as to execute what he had earlier told in person to the Premier while they were on a car, leaving the meeting of "Dar El-Fatwa" to Hariri's home in Wadi Abu Jamil. Then Hariri told Mikati these words exactly: "I won't leave you in peace, and do not expect that I leave you in peace. I'm even going to do everything I can to fail your government." Nevertheless, these words, in addition to the provocation and inconvenient talk haven't seemed to be affective, for Najib Mikati's government has acquired immunity on the local and foreign levels.
It is clear that Hariri has messed up in both battles; well, at least so far. Still, what seems conspicuous for observers is that the double failure hasn't created a motive for Hariri to reconsider his calculations and read facts as they are; instead; he has directly begun a third battle; this time it's against the Syrian regime, whereby the written statement Hariri issued a few days ago from his latest residence in Jeddah seems very similar to "the first statement": Hariri declares he has joined the anti-Syrian regime frontline since "it is no longer possible to tolerate what is going on in Syria", as Hariri puts it.
This, in fact, deserves objection; shouldn't Saad Hariri have considered the possibility of the decision of "Hizbullah", "Hizbullah Secretary General", or any Lebanese official to reply merely through comparing Saad Hariri's sudden "care" for the Syrian people today with his outrage when Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah talked about the Bahraini regime's crime against the Bahraini people? Why hasn't he kept in mind that one day he might have to borrow the "Sayyed's" expressions in a different context?
Hereupon, the question posed is: As long as Hariri hasn't reached an outcome in his battle against "Hizbullah" and its resistant arms, in addition to Najib Mikati and his government, why has he decided to begin the third battle against the Syrian regime? Is it his personal decision, or has this been in coordination with the Saudi Arabian command? And where does he want to get by leading this battle? Is there any choice that he can win the battle? What about the choice of losing it? Can he tell the Lebanese people that he would have acted the same way had he still been on top of the political power or had the Syrian-Saudi Initiative still been safe and conducted?
It is clear that Hariri's statement expresses his real emotions, at least ever since he was overthrown from the premier post. It is clear, too, that his statement is based on an obvious context of revenge from the second partner in his overthrowing - President Bashar Al-Assad, in addition to the first partner Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, as Hariri himself declared on "MTV Channel" (a Lebanese broadcasting company). As for announcing this revengeful context currently, it seems Hariri wants to impose it on a Syrian occasion; thus, he chose Hamah's (recent) incidents to point weapons at Al-Assad's regime.
While Hariri's fans consider his statement as a normal and an inevitable "stance of consolidation" with the Syrian people upon what it is suffering, some observers see that his statement expresses a revengeful logic, especially when the Syrian people, that suddenly Hariri has decided to consolidate with, was once chased before being the people they're (Hariri and his fans) crying for today. For instance, the Lebanese reminiscence has been full of a lot of chases and racial hunts for the Syrian workers in Lebanon since February 14th in 2005 until a very recent time. Still, what is more dangerous than this is the bias created by Hariri's speech and "the Cedars Revolution" against Syria and the Syrian people all through the past years.
What seems to have been the central reflection of Hariri and a weighty team of "the Future Party" and "the March-14 Alliance" hasn't been said by Hariri in his statement; yet, there exists a Euro-American secret word that has led him to bet on "the Syrian Month of Ramadan" and made him believe that the moment of revenging from Bashar Al-Assad has come closer. Also, it seems he has really wished he could be back to Beirut on Damascus International Airport Route this time.
Speaking about a Euro-American secret word does not exclude the fact that Hariri is unable to overcome the Saudi Arabian considerations. Hereupon, this question can be posed: Does Hariri's statement express a new Saudi Arabian stance, the second chapter of which might be the declaration of a direct stance of the Saudi Arabian command?
Still, the fear some are showing is not upon the revengeful dimension of Hariri's statement; instead, it's upon the possibility that the purpose beyond his statement is to arouse a political quarrel that increases gradually to become a political escalation first and a political clash afterwards, providing the atmosphere and environment for previously made agendas, on top of which is the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the indictments. Probably the point of the primary test is determined to be on the 11th of the current month, as the context of the indictment against the four "Hizbullah" cadres is to be exposed.
In fact, Saad Hariri's supporters have started to propagate that the indictment "includes dangerous facts that will rock Lebanon." Besides, the next testing point is to follow through the stages that are yet to come, particularly through the coming indictments, which are to include, within the accused parties, Syrian characters close to the Syrian president, the fans of Hariri are propagating.
