Fighting weaker forces has made "Israeli" Army soft
Source: AFP, 02-01-2008
Analysis
OCCUPIED AL-QUDS: "Israel's" armed forces, which took the rap in Wednesday's final report on failures in the 2006 Lebanon war, need to make big changes ahead of any new conflict, analysts said Friday. The Winograd Commission's report delivered an unprecedented verdict on the army, saying that daring, determination and initiative were all lacking in its war in Lebanon.
Since the 34-day war ended in a UN-brokered cease-fire on August 14, 2006, several steps have already been taken to correct perceived military failings.
On a strategic level, the idea that airpower alone is sufficient to vanquish an adversary has been discredited.
And tactically, the military has greatly boosted inter-service operations and training, which has suffered in recent years because of the focus on the Palestinian intifada.
But according to military experts - and to the Winograd Commission itself - the causes for the current state of the "Israeli" armed forces run deep.
For military historian Martin Van Creveld, it boils down to the fact that "an army that fights against weaker forces itself becomes weaker."
Battling armed Palestinian groups, over whom the "Israeli" military has overwhelming superiority, requires "prudence, patience and ensuring minimum losses," he said.
But in a full-scale war, "daring is vital, timing is of the essence, and losses become secondary" to winning the conflict.
Reservist Colonel Omer Bar-Lev believes the "crisis in the "Israeli" military's values emanates from society as a whole.
"'Israel' has become a society of abundance for some and one of poverty for others. When financial success and individualism are the motivating factors, people are no longer willing to sacrifice" these goals, said the former head of the top-secret Sayeret Matkal commando unit.
Bar-Lev attributed a less-combative spirit to profound divisions within society following the occupation of Palestinian territory over 40 years ago in the 1967 war. "Nobody wants to die for Hebron or Nablus just so these [West Bank] cities can remain under the power of "Israel"," he said.
Analyst Ran Edelist said it would seem "Israelis" are no longer willing to pay with their own lives to conquer such and such a place in South Lebanon, since they know they would merely pull out again a few days later.
In 2006, "reservists sent into Lebanon did not feel they were defending the very existence of 'Israel', and were not willing to sacrifice themselves," he said.
The Winograd report itself said: "An army must aspire to victory, and if it turns out from the beginning that such a victory is unattainable it is better to avoid a war."
The government-appointed commission, headed by retired judge Eliyahu Winograd, also blamed failures by the military on "altered values, as well as profound changes within 'Israeli' society, part of which is no longer prepared to accept lengthy wars and their cost in human lives."
But the report underlined that the military should not expect society to change before it corrects its own failings, and called for an end to complacency within the armed forces.
Senior officers quoted in "Israeli" media reports on Friday expressed their concern at the effect the Winograd report would have on military morale.
They were critical that the military as a whole, not just the top brass, had been stigmatized, saying the armed forces had been the first to recognize there had been failures.
Chief of staff Dan Halutz resigned after the conflict, as did Amir Peretz, who was defense (war) minister at the time.
During the war the military was unable to prevent Hizbullah from firing over 4,000 rockets into northern "Israel", causing a million residents to take to bomb shelters or to seek safety further south.
Analysis
OCCUPIED AL-QUDS: "Israel's" armed forces, which took the rap in Wednesday's final report on failures in the 2006 Lebanon war, need to make big changes ahead of any new conflict, analysts said Friday. The Winograd Commission's report delivered an unprecedented verdict on the army, saying that daring, determination and initiative were all lacking in its war in Lebanon.
Since the 34-day war ended in a UN-brokered cease-fire on August 14, 2006, several steps have already been taken to correct perceived military failings.
On a strategic level, the idea that airpower alone is sufficient to vanquish an adversary has been discredited.
And tactically, the military has greatly boosted inter-service operations and training, which has suffered in recent years because of the focus on the Palestinian intifada.
But according to military experts - and to the Winograd Commission itself - the causes for the current state of the "Israeli" armed forces run deep.
For military historian Martin Van Creveld, it boils down to the fact that "an army that fights against weaker forces itself becomes weaker."
Battling armed Palestinian groups, over whom the "Israeli" military has overwhelming superiority, requires "prudence, patience and ensuring minimum losses," he said.
But in a full-scale war, "daring is vital, timing is of the essence, and losses become secondary" to winning the conflict.
Reservist Colonel Omer Bar-Lev believes the "crisis in the "Israeli" military's values emanates from society as a whole.
"'Israel' has become a society of abundance for some and one of poverty for others. When financial success and individualism are the motivating factors, people are no longer willing to sacrifice" these goals, said the former head of the top-secret Sayeret Matkal commando unit.
Bar-Lev attributed a less-combative spirit to profound divisions within society following the occupation of Palestinian territory over 40 years ago in the 1967 war. "Nobody wants to die for Hebron or Nablus just so these [West Bank] cities can remain under the power of "Israel"," he said.
Analyst Ran Edelist said it would seem "Israelis" are no longer willing to pay with their own lives to conquer such and such a place in South Lebanon, since they know they would merely pull out again a few days later.
In 2006, "reservists sent into Lebanon did not feel they were defending the very existence of 'Israel', and were not willing to sacrifice themselves," he said.
The Winograd report itself said: "An army must aspire to victory, and if it turns out from the beginning that such a victory is unattainable it is better to avoid a war."
The government-appointed commission, headed by retired judge Eliyahu Winograd, also blamed failures by the military on "altered values, as well as profound changes within 'Israeli' society, part of which is no longer prepared to accept lengthy wars and their cost in human lives."
But the report underlined that the military should not expect society to change before it corrects its own failings, and called for an end to complacency within the armed forces.
Senior officers quoted in "Israeli" media reports on Friday expressed their concern at the effect the Winograd report would have on military morale.
They were critical that the military as a whole, not just the top brass, had been stigmatized, saying the armed forces had been the first to recognize there had been failures.
Chief of staff Dan Halutz resigned after the conflict, as did Amir Peretz, who was defense (war) minister at the time.
During the war the military was unable to prevent Hizbullah from firing over 4,000 rockets into northern "Israel", causing a million residents to take to bomb shelters or to seek safety further south.
