From Resistance Leader to the “Axis of the Axis”: How Did “Israel” “Read” Sayyed Nasrallah?

Translated By Al-Ahed News

Ali Haidar, Al-Akhbar Newspaper

Describing martyred Resistance leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah as the “axis of the axis” after his assassination was not merely a situational characterization by “Israeli” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu intended to underscore the significance of the operation.

Monday, September 28, 2026

A review of “Israeli” literature spanning nearly three decades reveals that the elements behind this description had been present, albeit in different terminology, in the assessments of senior professional figures in the “Israeli” military and intelligence establishment from an early stage: a leader who combined strategic thinking, organizational control, tactical engagement, and the ability to exploit psychological factors; a leader with exceptional knowledge of “Israel” and its society; a central actor in shaping deterrence and the battle for consciousness; a “center of gravity” for Hezbollah; and, ultimately, an intelligence assessment that placed him as a partner in Iran’s decision-making system and the regional axis.

“Israeli” perceptions of Sayyed Nasrallah’s unique qualities began to take shape after he assumed the position of secretary-general in 1992, but they became more pronounced as his experience in managing the confrontation accumulated, culminating in the “Israeli” withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000.

One of the earliest notable assessments came from Major General Amos Malka, then head of “Israel’s” Military Intelligence Directorate, Aman. In an interview with Yedioth Ahronoth on September 26, 2001, he described Sayyed Nasrallah’s approach as combining “strategic thinking, complete control, tactical action, and the exploitation of psychological factors.”

The significance of this assessment lies in the fact that it did not attribute a single quality to Sayyed Nasrallah, but rather identified the convergence of multiple levels of leadership in his persona. Strategic thinking connects military action to a broader political objective; organizational control means the ability to translate vision into institutional performance; tactical engagement keeps the senior leadership connected to developments on the ground; while the emphasis on psychological factors revealed an early recognition of his approach to the adversary’s consciousness as a central arena of conflict.

With “Israel’s” withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, this perception acquired an additional dimension. Sayyed Nasrallah’s ability to understand “Israeli” society became a central element in discussions about him, particularly following his famous “Spider’s Web” speech. Its significance stemmed from the strategic premise behind it: “Israel” possessed material and military superiority, but the real test of its strength lay in its social and political resilience.

Here, an element emerged early on that would repeatedly appear in the assessments of “Israeli” leaders and experts: Sayyed Nasrallah did not study the “Israeli” military alone; he studied the society behind it, as well as the media, domestic politics, and the sources of strength and weakness within that society. This knowledge of the adversary would later evolve from a tool for understanding "Israel" into a means of attempting to influence it.

Aman assigned more than 15 researchers to the “Hassan Nasrallah file” to analyze his personality and behavior and anticipate his responses to different scenarios.

The 2006 July War marked a major turning point in this relationship, as Hezbollah’s capabilities rose to the level of a deterrent force that went beyond the traditional role of Resistance movements. In the eyes of “Israeli” military and intelligence leaders, Sayyed Nasrallah became a commander managing a system of equations aimed at maintaining a balance- between military expansion and avoiding an uncontrolled slide into an all-out confrontation.

After the war, Sayyed Nasrallah’s speeches themselves became the subject of sustained “Israeli” monitoring, while security literature gradually shifted toward a broader concept: the “battle for consciousness.” The “Israeli” establishment came to understand that his speeches were not directed solely at Hezbollah’s supporters, but also at the “Israeli” public, the military, and decision-makers.

This highlights one of the most complex characteristics “Israel” attributed to Sayyed Nasrallah: his ability to deploy information, threats, imagery, words, and timing within the framework of the rules of conflict.

Major General Uzi Dayan, former head of “Israel’s” National Security Council, expressed this idea clearly in 2018 when he called for Sayyed Nasrallah’s assassination to be made a primary objective, citing the “enormous influence” he wielded within “Israel”.

Perhaps the clearest indication of the place Sayyed Nasrallah’s persona occupied in “Israeli” strategic thinking can be found not in politicians’ statements, but in the scale of the institutional resources that Military Intelligence devoted to studying him.

"Yedioth Ahronoth" revealed that a special team had been established within Aman’s Research Division, consisting of more than 15 researchers from different fields. Their work focused on analyzing his personality and behavior and anticipating his responses to different scenarios. The team continually updated its assessment based on information gathered from open sources and covert intelligence, building what the newspaper called the “Hassan Nasrallah file.”

This goes beyond mere intelligence curiosity about an adversary’s leader. All intelligence agencies study the leaders of their adversaries: their backgrounds, strengths and weaknesses, ideologies, and decision-making processes. But dedicating a team of this size to a single leader reflects Aman’s assumption that there was a close causal relationship between understanding his personality and understanding the behavior of the system he led.

The most significant development in Aman’s assessment, however, came when its perception of Sayyed Nasrallah shifted from his position within Hezbollah to his role within the Iranian system itself.

In a 2022 interview, Brigadier General Amit Saar, then head of Aman’s Research Division, rejected the characterization of the relationship between Sayyed Nasrallah and Iran as one between a “leader and subordinate.” Instead, he indicated that Sayyed Nasrallah was a “partner in decision-making” and the most prominent figure in the “Shiite axis system” after Imam Ali Khamenei.

This assessment is significant for two reasons.

First, it reveals the distinction between a professional intelligence assessment that viewed the relationship as one of partnership, with Sayyed Nasrallah retaining sufficient weight to participate in decision-making, and political-propaganda rhetoric portraying Hezbollah simply as an “Iranian proxy.”

Second- and more closely connected to the concept of the “axis of the axis”- it indicates that Sayyed Nasrallah’s center of gravity was not confined to Hezbollah. Placing him directly after Imam Khamenei in the hierarchy of the axis system represented an entirely new stage in the evolution of “Israel’s” perception of Sayyed Nasrallah.

Thus, it becomes clear that Netanyahu’s description of Sayyed Nasrallah as the “axis of the axis” was not merely a dramatic political characterization intended to emphasize the significance of the operation. Rather, it was a belated political summation of a long process of "Israeli" military and intelligence assessments.