Netanyahu Faces the Prospect of Losing Power: Could the Haredim Pave the Way for an Eisenkot Government?
By Jihad Haydar
As Benjamin Netanyahu calls for a national unity government and Gadi Eisenkot is tasked with forming the next government, “Israel” is entering a political phase that goes beyond the traditional struggle between coalition and opposition. At stake is a more fundamental question: Can the shift in the parliamentary balance of power translate into an actual transfer of power, or will political, constitutional and security-related complications allow Netanyahu to block the process or reshape it to his advantage?
Netanyahu’s call for a “national unity government,” on the eve of “Israeli” President Isaac Herzog announcing that Gadi Eisenkot had been tasked with forming the next government, was no isolated political initiative. It came at a critical juncture, as election results intersected with coalition-building calculations and the Haredi parties shifted from being traditional partners in Netanyahu’s camp to becoming potential kingmakers in the political process.
Notably, Netanyahu did not stop at calling for unity. He coupled his appeal with a sharp attack on Arab parties, warning against the formation of a government reliant on their support and portraying such a government as a threat to "Israel’s" security, Jewish identity and ability to confront Iran. This rhetoric is difficult to separate from his attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the proposed alternative government and shift the debate away from parliamentary arithmetic towards questions of national identity and security.
In this sense, Netanyahu’s call can be seen as an attempt to redefine the terms of government formation at a time when the parliamentary numbers theoretically allow for alternatives that do not necessarily include him. The crucial question, however, is not simply whether Eisenkot has the mandate to form a government, but whether he can turn that mandate into a coalition capable of winning the Knesset’s confidence and remaining in power.
1. The parliamentary arithmetic opens the door but does not determine the outcome
The parliamentary landscape, based on the figures available, reveals a fundamental paradox: although Netanyahu’s bloc has 53 seats, compared with 48 for the Change Alliance led by Eisenkot, this numerical advantage alone is not enough to guarantee Netanyahu’s continued hold on power.
The United Torah Judaism [UTJ] party’s decision not to recommend either candidate is particularly significant. At the very least, it signals that the party is not automatically committed to recreating the previous coalition. It also opens the door to negotiations that could redistribute parliamentary allegiances, even if temporarily or conditionally.
If Eisenkot succeeds in reaching an understanding with UTJ, which holds seven seats, parliamentary support for his potential government would rise from 48 to 55, putting it two seats ahead of Netanyahu’s bloc.
If Shas, which holds six seats, also joins, the total would rise to 61 seats, giving the government an absolute majority in the 120-member Knesset.
This arithmetic points to two distinct possibilities.
The first is the formation of a government backed by 55 lawmakers, provided it secures the necessary confidence vote and enough other lawmakers abstain rather than vote against it. Under the assumed distribution of votes, Arab parties abstaining could produce a 55-53 result, allowing the government to secure a majority of votes cast.
The second possibility is a government backed by 61 lawmakers if both Haredi parties join, giving it an absolute parliamentary majority and reducing its dependence on the positions of factions outside the coalition.
Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between the majority needed to win a confidence vote, the majority required to pass certain legislation, and the majority necessary to ensure political stability. Having enough votes to install a government does not necessarily mean having the ability to manage its internal contradictions or push through its political agenda.
This is where the Haredi parties become particularly important. They may not hold the largest number of seats, but they could determine which of the two scenarios becomes reality.
2. Why is “United Torah Judaism” the more negotiable partner?
“United Torah Judaism” occupies a distinctive position within “Israel’s” party system. Unlike nationalist and ideological right-wing parties, it does not place national security and nationalist issues at the center of its political identity to the same extent. It is, however, deeply conservative on religious and social issues, particularly those concerning Jewish religious law and the relationship between religion and the state.
Its traditional alignment with the right has been driven by a combination of political, religious and practical considerations, rather than complete agreement with all the priorities of the right-wing camp.
Its main demands revolve around preserving the autonomy of Haredi religious and educational institutions, securing government funding and maintaining special arrangements exempting students at religious seminaries from military service.
From this perspective, it cannot be ruled out that UTJ could negotiate with an Eisenkot-led government if it believes its core interests can be secured outside its traditional alliance with Netanyahu.
However, being open to negotiations does not necessarily mean being prepared to join a new coalition. There is a difference between using the possibility of an alliance with Eisenkot to secure better negotiating terms and making a strategic decision to break with the right-wing camp.
That distinction may well define UTJ’s position in the coming period.
3. Netanyahu’s failure to resolve the conscription issue weakens his guarantees to the Haredim
One of the main factors that could prompt the Haredi parties to reconsider their position is Netanyahu’s failure over the past four years to secure a lasting legal arrangement exempting religious seminary students from military service, despite this being one of the most important demands of his Haredi coalition partners.
The significance of this failure goes beyond the failure to deliver on a political promise. It raises questions about Netanyahu’s ability to honor his commitments in the future, even if he returns to the premiership.
The obstacles he faced were not limited to political opposition. Reservations also emerged within his own Likud party over expanding military exemptions amid the growing human and security burdens of the war.
Public opposition to what many see as an unequal distribution of military service obligations also makes any comprehensive arrangement politically costly, particularly for parties whose constituencies include people serving in the military or reserve forces.
There is also a judicial obstacle: the role of “Israel’s” Supreme Court, which can review conscription legislation and assess whether it complies with the country's legal and constitutional principles, including equality.
This means the problem Netanyahu failed to resolve would not simply disappear with a change of government. It would remain a challenge for any new coalition, including a potential government led by Eisenkot.
Nevertheless, a change of government could create an opportunity to explore a different compromise that balances legal considerations, military needs and Haredi demands. The question remains whether such an arrangement would be enough to persuade the Haredi parties to change their political allegiance.
4. Why might the Haredi parties hesitate to leave Netanyahu’s camp?
Despite the factors that could encourage UTJ to negotiate with Eisenkot, significant constraints make joining a new coalition a complicated decision.
The first is the Haredi parties’ longstanding political ties to the right-wing camp. This relationship has produced networks of interests, understandings and mutual trust that cannot easily be dismantled simply because election results have changed.
The second constraint is the clash between Haredi demands and the positions of some parties in Eisenkot’s alliance, particularly those that regard equality in military service as a matter of principle on which no concessions should be made.
This is not necessarily a negotiating detail that can be resolved through the allocation of ministerial portfolios or increased government funding. It concerns one of the most sensitive issues in “Israeli” society.
A third constraint concerns the credibility of any guarantees Eisenkot might offer. The Haredi parties will want to know whether the prime minister-designate can actually deliver on his commitments or whether the balance of power within his coalition would prevent him from going far enough to meet their demands.
The most significant paradox, however, is that joining a new government could eventually weaken the Haredi parties’ bargaining power.
If Eisenkot succeeds in forming a government and removing Netanyahu from power, new political dynamics could emerge. These could include the government securing parliamentary support from outside the coalition or shifts in the balance of power within Likud itself.
In such a scenario, the Haredi parties could lose their position as kingmakers whose support determines whether the government survives, particularly if an alternative majority can be secured to defeat attempts to bring it down.
Moreover, the fall of a government after its formation would not automatically return Netanyahu to power. The procedures for dissolving the Knesset, forming an alternative government and maintaining a caretaker administration make the process considerably more complicated than a simple reversal of parliamentary arithmetic.
The Haredim therefore face a double dilemma: remain with Netanyahu, who has failed to deliver on their core demands, or move towards Eisenkot without sufficient guarantees that their bargaining power will remain intact once a new government is formed.
5. Netanyahu’s call for unity: political necessity and a battle over legitimacy
Against this backdrop, Netanyahu’s call for a national unity government carries implications that go beyond its stated purpose.
In terms of timing, it came as Eisenkot’s mandate to form a government opened an institutional path towards a transfer of power. In terms of rhetoric, it was accompanied by an attempt to delegitimize any government reliant on Arab parties by linking such support to the dangers of terrorism, extremism and the Iranian threat.
This can be interpreted as an attempt to shift the confrontation away from parliamentary arithmetic, where a government's legitimacy is determined by constitutional rules, and towards security and identity, where Netanyahu seeks to portray himself as the figure best equipped to protect the state.
The claim that a government dependent on Arab parties would be unable to confront Iran or would expose “Israel” to an existential threat is not a legal consequence of the coalition's composition. Rather, it is a political position intended to influence public perceptions and the calculations of undecided parties.
This highlights one of the functions of Netanyahu’s unity rhetoric: it allows him to present his continued participation in government as a response to national necessity rather than a partisan choice. At the same time, it puts his opponents in an awkward political position: either agree to cooperate with him or assume responsibility for forming a government that he portrays as incapable of addressing security challenges.
This interpretation, however, does not rule out genuine security considerations behind the call for unity, given the ongoing war and regional tensions. The important distinction is between the existence of objective security challenges and the way they are being used in the political struggle over government formation.
Netanyahu’s appeal may therefore serve two overlapping purposes: keeping the door open to continued participation in power while raising the political cost for parties considering enabling Eisenkot to form an alternative government.
6. Arab parties: kingmakers amid attempts to sideline them
One of the most striking paradoxes in “Israel’s” political landscape is that Arab parties, despite being outside the proposed governing coalition, could play an influential role in determining its fate.
If Eisenkot manages to secure the support of 55 lawmakers, the position Arab lawmakers take in the confidence vote could become decisive, depending on the positions of other factions, their members' attendance and how they vote.
If the government is formed, Arab parties could also influence votes on legislation and the budget, or help prevent a majority from emerging to bring it down. This would not necessarily mean that they were committed to supporting all of its policies.
This reality helps explain why Netanyahu has focused so heavily on attacking Arab parties and portraying any reliance on their parliamentary support as incompatible with national security requirements.
The confrontation is not simply about who gets a seat in government. It is also about who has the right to influence its formation and survival.
This exposes a political and constitutional contradiction: Arab lawmakers enjoy, in principle, the same parliamentary rights as other members of the Knesset, yet the legitimacy of their role in determining who exercises executive power has become a subject of political and ideological dispute.
This tension between parliamentary rules and political rhetoric could become one of the factors shaping the government formation process, particularly if Eisenkot fails to secure an absolute majority without outside support.
7. The US factor and regional war in the government formation equation
These developments are not unfolding in a regional or international vacuum. The results of the US midterm elections, which weakened President Donald Trump’s political standing, add another variable to "Israel’s" calculations.
If this setback narrows Trump's political room for maneuver, it could affect his ability to provide political backing for Netanyahu and limit the latter’s options in managing the domestic political struggle. It could also influence the nature of US pressure over the regional war.
However, a weakening of the US president and a decline in Netanyahu’s political standing are not automatically or necessarily linked. US-“Israeli” security relations are also shaped by institutions, interests and alliances that extend beyond the American president’s electoral position.
Meanwhile, the war in the region remains a factor capable of reshaping priorities within "Israel".
Military escalation could strengthen calls for a national unity government, but it does not predetermine who would lead it. Netanyahu can invoke security threats to justify remaining in power, while Eisenkot can draw on the same concerns to argue for a new government with parliamentary legitimacy and a different approach to managing the war.
The war could thus evolve from an external pressure factor into a direct element in the struggle for power, with each side seeking to present its proposed government as best suited to the demands of the moment.
However, this will depend on military developments, the positions of the political parties and public opinion. There is no basis for assuming that the war will necessarily affect the domestic balance of power in one particular direction.
8. Forming a government is one thing; ensuring its stability is another
The preceding analysis points to the need to distinguish between three related but separate questions: the ability to form a government, the ability to win a confidence vote and the ability to remain in power.
The parliamentary arithmetic makes it possible, in principle, to envisage an Eisenkot-led government backed by 55 lawmakers, or 61 if both Haredi parties join.
However, turning those numbers into a political agreement would require addressing genuine contradictions, foremost among them military conscription, the relationship between religion and the state, the role of Arab parties, and security and regional policies.
UTJ’s position, moreover, cannot be reduced to its decision not to recommend either Netanyahu or Eisenkot. Its abstention could reflect political reservations, an attempt to improve its negotiating position or a willingness to reconsider existing alliances. It is impossible to determine which interpretation is correct before the consultations produce clearer results.
Similarly, Shas joining the coalition would not automatically follow from an agreement with UTJ, despite the overlap in their interests. Each party has its own leadership, political and religious calculations, and relationships with other political forces.
Therefore, the existence of a parliamentary and legal basis for a transfer of power does not eliminate the political obstacles standing in its way. Equally, those obstacles do not automatically entitle Netanyahu to remain in office.
The outcome remains open and will depend on the parties’ ability to reach workable agreements, not simply on their declared willingness to negotiate.
Conclusion: The battle is no longer just about the majority, but about the terms of a transfer of power.
The current political moment in “Israel” marks a shift from electoral competition to a test of whether election results can be translated into a stable executive government.
Netanyahu, whose bloc holds 53 seats according to the figures presented, faces a reality in which having the largest bloc does not guarantee him the right to form a government. Eisenkot, meanwhile, has a mandate that opens the way to an alternative coalition, but he still lacks sufficient guarantees that he can overcome the political and ideological divisions among its potential members.
At the center of this equation are the Haredi parties, particularly United Torah Judaism, which face a test that goes beyond their traditional demands: will they maintain their alliance with Netanyahu despite his failure to resolve the conscription issue, or explore the possibility of securing a different arrangement under a new government, with all the political risks that entails?
Netanyahu, for his part, is seeking to influence the terms of a potential transfer of power through his call for unity and his emphasis on security threats, rather than merely contesting which parties will participate in the next coalition.
More importantly, any potential change of government would not automatically resolve the contradictions that produced the current crisis. Instead, it could transfer them into the new coalition, where managing internal disagreements would become essential to its survival.
Ultimately, the central paradox is not simply that Netanyahu has lost the ability to monopolize the government formation process through parliamentary arithmetic. It is that the very forces capable of paving the way for an alternative government could also make that government's stability extremely difficult to secure.
Between parliamentary calculations, Haredi demands, the role of Arab parties, US pressure and the prospect of regional escalation, one question remains open: will this moment lead to a reshaping of political power, or merely reproduce the crisis under a different political balance?
What is clear is that the battle is no longer confined to determining which side has the largest number of seats. It is now about who can turn parliamentary numbers into legitimacy, legitimacy into a government, and a government into an administration capable of staying in power.
